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Abstract
This paper examines optimal exchange-rate policy in two-country sticky-price general
equilibrium models in which households and firms optimize over an infinite horizon in an environment
of uncertainty.  The models are in the vein of the “new open-economy macroeconomics” as
exemplified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998, 2000).  The conditions under which fixed or floating
exchange rates yield higher welfare, or the optimal foreign exchange intervention rule, depend on the
exact nature of price stickiness and on the degree of risk-sharing opportunities.  This paper presents
some preliminary empirical evidence on the behavior of consumer prices in Mexico that suggests
failures of the law of one price are important.   The evidence on price setting and risk-sharing
opportunities is not refined enough to make definitive conclusions about the optimal exchange-rate
regime for that country.
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What is the optimal exchange rate policy for Mexico?  Is replacing pesos with U.S. dollars or
adopting a currency board that permanently fixes the peso to the U.S. dollar?  Should the peso have a
fully flexible exchange rate with the dollar?  Or should Mexican monetary policy be used to target the
peso/dollar exchange rate, allowing for neither fully fixed nor fully flexible rates?
The traditional approach to fixed versus floating exchange rate questions examines the short
run stabilizing properties of each regime.  Friedman’s (1953) famous argument for floating exchange
rates stipulates that in the long run the exchange rate system does not have significant real
consequences.  His reasoning is that the exchange rate system is ultimately a choice of monetary
regimes.  In the end, monetary policy does not matter for real quantities, he argues, but in the short run
it does.  He comments:
If internal prices were as inflexible as exchange rates, it would make little
economic difference whether adjustments were brought about by changes in exchange
rates or by equivalent changes in internal prices.  But this condition is clearly not
fulfilled.  The exchange rate is potentially flexible in the absence of administrative action
to freeze it.  At least in the modern world, internal prices are highly inflexible.
Friedman, of course, makes the case for flexible exchange rates as a vehicle for achieving rapid
changes in international relative prices.
Buiter (1999) also contends that the choice of exchange-rate regime is also pertinent only to
short-run stabilization questions:
The theory of optimal currency areas is one of the low points of post-World War
II monetary economics.  Its key failure is a chronic confusion between transitory nominal
rigidities and permanent real rigidities.  The result is a greatly overblown account of the
power of monetary policy to affect real economic performance, for good or for bad.
While Buiter is overstating the irrelevance of monetary regimes for longer-run economic performance,
examination of the short-run effects of monetary regimes is certainly more squarely in the tradition of
modern macroeconomic thinking.2
Friedman wrote at a time in which there was little capital mobility among even the richest
countries.  Floating exchange rates maintained a zero current account balance, thus shutting off any
channel for transmission of foreign shocks.  In a series of papers, Mundell (1960, 1961b, 1963)
demonstrated that the insulation properties of floating exchange rates are diminished in the presence of
capital mobility.  The answer to the question of which is better – fixed or floating exchange rates –
became more complicated, depending on whether the source of shocks was monetary or real; the
degree of capital and other factor mobility; and the relative size of countries.
Both Friedman and Mundell assumed nominal prices are sticky in the short run.  Friedman
argued that the choice of exchange rate system would be irrelevant if all nominal prices adjusted
instantaneously to shocks.  Subsequent to Friedman and Mundell, a large number of authors examined
the choice of exchange-rate regime under the assumption of some sort of nominal price or wage
stickiness.  These studies extended Mundell by incorporating expectations of future price and exchange
rate changes.  In that analysis, the choice of exchange rate regime was based on ad hoc criteria, such as
minimization of the variance of output.  Examples of contributors to that literature include Turnovsky
(1976, 1983), Fischer (1977), Hamada and Sakurai (1978), Flood (1979), Flood and Marion (1982),
Weber (1981), Kimbrough (1983), Aizenman and Frenkel (1985), Flood and Hodrick (1986) and Glick
and Wihlborg (1990).
Related work is on “optimum currency areas”.  This literature addresses the question of
whether countries should share a single currency.  Mundell (1961a) was the pioneer in this field.  Other
contributors include McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Ingram (1969), Tower and Willett (1976),
Eichengreen (1990, 1992, 1993, 1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, 1997a, 1997b, 1998) and
Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998).  Recent surveys include Masson and Taylor (1993) and Willett (1999).
This literature argues that countries should consider having their own currency when they are large,
and not very open.  Smaller open economies are candidates for a currency union.  Exchange-rate3
flexibility is desirable between countries that are subject to idiosyncratic real supply and demand
shocks.  When factor mobility is high between a pair of countries, the case for a common currency is
stronger because the factor mobility provides an alternative means of adjustment to real shocks if the
exchange-rate channel is eliminated.  In addition, two countries are good candidates for a single
currency if there is a high degree of fiscal integration, and there are fiscal mechanisms in place to allow
redistribution.
Here, we investigate the optimality of exchange rate regimes from a welfare maximization
standpoint.  We are not the first to study the welfare properties of alternative exchange-rate systems.
Prior studies include Lapan and Enders (1980), Helpman (1981), Helpman and Razin (1982), Eaton
(1985), Aizenman (1994), Chinn and Miller (1998), and Neumeyer (1998).  These papers, however, do
not assume any sort of nominal price stickiness, and therefore do not follow directly in the tradition of
Friedman and Mundell.
This paper builds two-country (the U.S. and Mexico) economic models in which agents are
forward looking and optimize in an environment of uncertainty, but in which there are short-run
nominal price rigidities.  The models are extensions of the New Open-Economy Macroeconomic
models of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998, 2000).  Those models, which fully incorporate uncertainty into
the dynamic open-economy sticky-price general equilibrium literature, build on many precursors
including, most directly, Corsetti and Pesenti (1997) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).  These models
are examples of recent international models with optimizing agents and prices that are sticky but in
which the law of one price holds for traded goods.  Other examples include Svensson and van
Wijnbergen (1989), Kollman (1996), Rankin (1998), and Hau (1998).
While most of the aforementioned papers assume that the law of one price holds for all traded
goods, the models in this paper make other pricing assumptions, building directly on the papers of
Devereux and Engel (1998) and Devereux, Engel and Tille (1999).  They are also related to the work4
of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998) and Betts and Devereux (1996, 1998, 2000).  Other recent
general equilibrium models in which prices are sticky, but in which the law of one price does not hold,
include Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997) and Tille (1998a, 1998b).
Most studies of Latin American economies ignore the empirical evidence of failures of the law
of one price, even for traded goods.  Section 1 of this paper provides some broad statistical evidence
that suggests strongly that there are significant deviations from the law of one price for Mexican
consumer goods.  Indeed, it appears that these deviations are much more important in accounting for
real exchange rate movements in the 1990s than changes in the relative price of traded to nontraded
goods.  Many studies --  including some of those at this conference, such as Cooley and Quadrini
(1999), Mendoza (1999), and Schmitt-Grohé and Uríbe (1999) – assume that the law of one price holds
for traded goods.
In the models presented in section 2, there are a large number of monopolistic firms in each of
Mexico and the U.S.  Each firm must set nominal prices for its goods one period in advance.
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998), firms set prices optimally to maximize the value of the firm.
However, there are three types of ways in which prices can be sticky: firms can set prices in their own
currencies; they can set prices in consumers’ currencies; or, some firms could set prices in producers’
currencies while others set them in consumers’ currencies.  The standard models in which prices are
set in producers’ currencies assume that the law of one price holds: the price of the good is fixed in the
country where the goods is produced, but the price varies one-for-one with the nominal exchange rate
for foreign consumers.  The evidence of section 1 shows that this is a bad assumption for Mexico.
Two possible alternatives are to assume that producers set prices in consumers’ currencies, or that all
U.S. produced goods are priced in U.S. dollars while Mexican firms set prices in consumers’
currencies.  The former assumption implies that consumer prices are not responsive to changes in
nominal exchange rates in the short run.  The law of one price fails for all goods when there are5
unanticipated nominal exchange rate shocks.  The latter assumption means that the law of one price
holds for U.S. produced goods.  As the peso depreciates, the peso cost of U.S. goods increases.  This is
consistent with the widespread belief that Mexican producers benefit compared to foreign producers
when the peso depreciates.  But under this assumption, the law of one price fails for Mexican-produced
goods, which could possibly account for the empirical evidence presented in section 1.
There simply has not been sufficient study of goods pricing in Mexico (and other Latin
American countries).  While there has been a lot of focus on how the relative price of traded to
nontraded goods change within countries, very little work has been done to investigate nominal
rigidities and the law of one price.  But, we shall see that the choice of exchange-rate policy depends
critically on how nominal prices react in the short run to exchange-rate changes.
Another important issue in determining optimal exchange rate policy is the degree to which
individuals can insure against exchange-rate changes under more flexible regimes.  One notable
shortcoming of the old fixed but adjustable currency peg in Mexico was the risk of occasional large
devaluations.  That risk may also exist under the current regime of controlled floating exchange rates.
The problem is that there are not enough hedging instruments to allow agents to insure fully against
these abrupt changes in exchange rates.  In a world of perfectly flexible prices, a nominal devaluation
would not necessarily imply any real changes in wealth.  But in the short run with sticky nominal
prices, nominal devaluations are inevitably real devaluations.
The new open-economy macroeconomics literature has not addressed these issues.  In some
models (Corsetti and Pesenti (1997), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998)), the law of one price holds for all
goods.  Devaluations do not impose any purchasing power risk.  Indeed, in the set-up of Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1998), because exchange-rate changes immediately cause changes in prices consumers pay,
terms of trade fluctuations insure against all real shocks.  Just as in the flexible-price model of Cole
and Obstfeld (1991), there is no need for formal insurance markets since terms of trade changes6
effectively completely insure.  In practice, however, the law of one price fails in the short run.
Nominal exchange rate fluctuations are associated with real exchange rate changes for consumers.
However, the model of Devereux and Engel (1998) assumes complete (nominally-denominated)
contingent claims.  It cannot address the concerns of missing financial markets.
This paper takes a first step toward addressing the traditional concerns of macroeconomic
stability in fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes, but in a model with limited insurance markets.
The model takes into account how fixed exchange rate regimes eliminate the need for insurance
against nominal exchange rate shocks that lead to deviations from the law of one price.   The policy
conclusions are compared with the recommendations reached under the assumption of a complete
market in nominal contingent claims.
Finally, a standard approach to calibrating some general equilibrium models is to take linear
approximations around the long-run steady state.  In the context of the models of this paper, that
amounts to assuming that policy-makers care only about the variance of consumption.  But, we shall
see that exchange-rate policy can affect the expected level of consumption and leisure as well.
1  The
policy recommendations are very different if policy-makers seek only to minimize the second moment
of consumption.  Perhaps this suggests that we are not yet at the stage where we can expect to give
accurate policy recommendations based solely on miniature general equilibrium models.  A more
fruitful avenue would be to use macroeconomic theory as a guide to some of the issues that arise in the
choice of optimal monetary institutions for Mexico, while recognizing that accurate answers await
better empirical evidence and more sophisticated modeling.
                                               
1  In the models of this paper, leisure enters utility linearly, so the variance of leisure does not matter.7
1.  Empirical Evidence of Local-Currency Pricing
This section follows Engel (1999) in producing measures of the importance of deviations of the
law of one price in overall variation of the real exchange rate between Mexico and the United States.
2
The evidence is not direct evidence on nominal price stickiness, but is suggestive of the role of local-
currency pricing.  Taken in conjunction with Rogers (1999), the evidence is strongly consistent with
the hypothesis that prices are set in the short-run in consumers’ currencies and real exchange rate
variation is due to fluctuating nominal exchange rates on top of sticky nominal prices.
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where starred (*) variables represent U.S. values.
Define the real exchange rate as the relative price of Mexican goods:
t t t t p p s q - + ”
* . (1.3)
                                               
2   Much of my work in this area is inspired by Mussa (1986).8
From equations (1.1)-(1.3), the real exchange rate can be written as:
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In the model of this paper, all goods are traded.  Changes in the real exchange rate come only
from movements in  t x  – i.e., from deviations from the law of one price.  The model focuses on the
short-run properties of fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes.  (The values of real variables in the
long run are unaffected by the choice of exchange-rate regime.)  In this section, the question  addressed
is: Are short-run Mexican/U.S. real exchange rate variations primarily coming from deviations from
the law of one price?
The alternative possibility is that  t y  accounts for much of the short-run variation in real
exchange rates.  That is the channel implicit in almost all theoretical models of real exchange rate
behavior for Latin America, but that channel is missing from the model of this paper.  Is it reasonable
to exclude short-run changes in  t y  in describing short-run real exchange rate behavior?
The statistic  j j  measures the fraction of the variance of j-month real exchange rate changes
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There are other possible ways to decompose the variance of the real exchange rate into a part
attributable to  t x  and a part attributable to  t y , depending on how the covariance of the two
components is treated.  This measure tends to understate the importance of the  t x  as long as the
covariance term is positive (which it is at most short horizons), but any alternative treatment of the
covariance has very little effect on the measured relative importance of the  t x  component.
Engel (1999) decomposes the mean-squared error of real exchange rate movements rather than
the variance.  (The difference is that the mean-squared error includes the squared mean change.)  In
practice, that also makes little difference in the calculated share of movement assigned to  t x .  Only the
variance decomposition is reported here, for convenience.
If the law of one price holds,  j j  should be zero at all horizons.  Although one would not expect
the  t x  to be zero literally in all horizons in the data, one expects  j j  to be small if the relative price of
nontraded goods is the chief mover of the real exchange rate.
Mexican official statistics report a (seasonally unadjusted) series for consumer prices of traded
goods.  The data was obtained from Datastream, and is monthly from September 1991 – August 1999.
For the U.S., the consumer price of “commodities” is used as the price of traded goods.  (Consumer
prices in the U.S. are split into commodities and services.)  The exchange rate is the monthly average
market rate.  Measures of the overall consumer price indexes are taken from the same sources.
Figure 1 plots  j j  for  24 ,... 2 , 1 = j .  Given that there are only eight years of monthly data, one
must treat the estimated longer variances with some skepticism.10
The striking thing about Figure 1 is that at all horizons,  j j  is quite large.  At the 1-month
horizon it is greater than 0.99.  Even at the six-month horizon, it exceeds 0.96.  The smallest value
reported is just slightly below 0.89.  The values of  j j  do decrease as the horizon increases, as one
might expect if the importance of deviations from the law of one price diminish over time.  But clearly
at the horizons relevant for the analysis of this paper, it is deviations from the law of one price that
dominate real consumer exchange rates.
An alternative interpretation of these statistics is that the measured price of “traded” consumer
goods is actually the price of a basket of goods and services.  At the consumer level, prices reflect the
marketing and transportation services that bring the good to the consumer.  So, the variation in  t x , it
might be argued, really reflects variation in the price of these nontraded services relative to the price of
the traded commodity.
That is,  t x  can be further decomposed into two components in exactly the same way that  t q
was:
t t t u d x + = . (1.8)
Here,  t d  represents the (unobserved) true deviation from the law of one price for the traded
commodity, and  t u  is the relative price of nontraded marketing services to traded commodity price in
Mexico relative to the U.S.













Assume the true deviations from the law of one price,  t d , are uncorrelated with  t u  and  t y .  Then,
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j q  measures the “explained” variance in a regression of  t j t x x - +  on  t j t y y - + .   j r  is the correlation
coefficient between   t j t u u - +  and  t j t y y - + .  (The measure of the  t y  component is derived from  t x
and  t q :   t t t x q y - = .)
This statistic can be used in two ways to get a sense of how plausible the marketing story is.
First, assume  1 = r , so that the relative price of nontraded marketing services to commodities is
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This statistic necessarily attributes less of the variance of the real exchange rate to deviations from the
law of one price, compared to  j j  plotted in Figure 1.  But, it makes little difference.  Figure 2 plots
j j ~ .  In constructing Figure 2, at the first four horizons,  j q  is set equal to zero.  That is because at
those horizons,  ) , ( t j t t j t y y x x Cov - - + +  is negative.  This contradicts the underlying assumption of
this exercise (that  t d is uncorrelated with  t u  and  t y ; and  t u  and  t y  are perfectly correlated.)12
The lesson from Figure 2 is that if the relative price of nontraded marketing services behaves
just like the relative price of other nontraded goods, it cannot be a very large component of  t x  since
) , ( t j t t j t y y x x Cov - - + +  is quite small at all horizons.
Perhaps a fairer test of the marketing hypothesis would be to allow the correlation of  t u  and  t y
to be less than perfect.  That correlation is not easily identified.  But, note more generally
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j r  that makes the share of the variance of true deviations from the law of one price as
small as one half can be backed out of this equation for each horizon j.  Those are plotted in Figure 3.
They are all very small.  The point is simply that if the explanation for Figure 1 is that “traded” prices
measured in  t x  contain a large nontraded component from marketing and distribution, that component
would have to be nearly uncorrelated with measured nontraded goods prices.  Real exchange rate
theories that rely on variation of nontraded marketing prices would need to rely on entirely different
sources of shocks than the ones that drive measured nontraded goods prices.
It appears more plausible to conclude that the simple interpretation of Figure 1 is the correct
one: that most variation in real exchange rates in the short run comes from variation in traded goods
prices across locations.
Since Mexican and U.S. consumer price indexes do not weight goods equally, might not the
variance of  t x  be attributable to terms of trade changes?   Evidence from subcategories of products
suggest not.  Let  ht a  be the weight of product h in the traded goods price index for Mexico, and 
*
ht a  be
the weight for the same product in the U.S. price index.  Then13
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If the law of one price holds for all goods, then  0 =
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When the law of one price holds for all goods, changes in the real exchange rate only occur when the
relative price of individual traded goods change, and those traded goods have different weights in the
U.S. and Mexican price indexes.  For example, if food has a higher weight in the Mexican traded14
consumer price index compared to the U.S., then an increase in the price of food relative to other
traded goods will raise the Mexican traded consumer price index relative to that in the U.S.
If the law of one price holds, the statistic 
h
















should be zero at all horizons.  Conversely, if the law of one price does not hold, 
h
j j ˆ  should be large
for many goods.
Figure 4 plots 
h
j j ˆ  for  24 ,... 2 , 1 = j .  The plots are for three categories of goods that are
primarily traded: food, household furnishings, and apparel.  The data sources and dates are the same as
those described above.
The evidence from Figure 4 supports the presumption that movement in  t x  in the short run
comes from deviations from the law of one price.  At all horizons plotted, for all three categories of
goods, 
h
j j ˆ  is large – not at all close to zero.
Of course, it is possible that at some finer level of disaggregation, there are significant changes
in relative traded goods prices within Mexico and the U.S. that are driving movements in 
h
j j ˆ .  At some
level this is tautologically true: goods sold to consumers in Mexico and in U.S. are different goods
because the location the good is sold is part of the characteristic of the good. But the statistics
presented in Figures 1-4 limit the types of models of real exchange rate behavior one might appeal to if
one rejects the interpretation that failures of the law of one price drive the real exchange rate.15
Finally, if the law of one price fails, is it because of local-currency pricing?  The models
considered in this paper assume that for some goods there is local-currency pricing.  That is, at least
some producers set nominal prices in consumers’ currencies.
There are two pieces of evidence that appear to support the local-currency-pricing story.  First
is Rogers’s (1999) study of consumer prices in Mexico, the U.S. and Canada.  In his study, data on
aggregate consumer prices for cities in those three countries is examined.  He finds that distance
between cities explains much of the variation in relative price levels.  That evidence supports the
notion that the law of one price fails because of transportation costs and other real factors that drive a
wedge between prices in different locations.  But, even taking into account distance, relative price
levels vary to a much greater degree for city pairs that lie across national borders than for city pairs
that lie within a country.
3  This evidence is consistent with the local-currency pricing effect.  Indeed,
the relative sizes of the U.S./Mexico, U.S./Canada, and Canada/Mexico border effects are nearly
identical to the relative sizes of the nominal exchange rate variance for those countries.
Some simple direct evidence comes from examining the correlation of the nominal exchange
rate with  t x .  Figure 5 plots values of the correlation of  t j t x x - +  with  t j t s s - + .  It shows that at
horizons  24 ,... 2 , 1 = j , the correlation is greater than 0.75.  At shorter horizons, the correlation exceeds
0.90.  So, an approximately accurate description of the data is that 
T
t p  and 
T
t p
*  are constant or very
slow moving, while  t s  varies much more over time.
That does not necessarily imply that nominal prices are sticky, in the sense that they are not
responding to forces of supply and demand.  Perhaps it is the case that 
T
t p  and 
T
t p
*  are relatively
constant over time because monetary policy does a good job in stabilizing nominal prices.  Under this
                                               
3   Rogers (1999) thus extends the analysis of Engel and Rogers (1996) to include Mexico, and finds similar results.  Note
however that Rogers (1999) uses only aggregate consumer prices, while Engel and Rogers (1996) use somewhat
disaggregated price indexes.16
theory, movement in  t x  really does represent changes in the real forces that segment Mexican and
American markets.  But this explanation has a curious implication.  Since monetary policy is
stabilizing 
T
t p  and 
T
t p
* , the nominal exchange rate must do all of the adjustment in response to these
changes in market segmentation.  In short, it is a theory under which nominal exchange rate changes
are entirely determined by transportation costs!   This is an implausible alternative to the simple
conclusion that 
T
t p  and 
T
t p
*  are stable because consumer prices adjust more slowly than nominal
exchange rates.
The data is consistent with the local-currency pricing assumption.  Perhaps other models can
explain the consumer price data as well, but, inescapably, they would be unusual theories.
2.  The Models
In this section, we investigate two-country models.  We label the countries Mexico and the
United States.   The models of this section assume that all goods produced are final consumer goods.
The goods are produced in monopolistically competitive markets.  In each country there are a large
number of goods produced, each of which is an imperfect substitute for all other goods.  Producers
must set prices one period in advance.
As is well known from the menu-cost literature, the monopolistic assumption has several
advantages for motivating sticky-price models in which output is demand-determined in the short run.
In the first place, the notion that firms can set prices, in itself, implies some market power for
producers.  A producer in competitive markets must take market prices as given and cannot announce a
price in advance.  But monopolistic producers are able to set prices for their products, and may not
change those preset prices in response to supply or demand shocks if there are menu costs and the size17
of the shocks is sufficiently small.  Since producers are monopolists, they set prices above marginal
costs.  If there is an increase in demand for the product, the producer is willing to increase output to
satisfy demand at preset prices as long as the increase in demand does not push into a region where
marginal costs exceed the price.  So, the monopolistic setting offers a rationale for demand-determined
output.  This “New Keynesian” approach also offers a rationale for macroeconomic policies that might
stimulate output.  Because monopolistic producers choose inefficiently low output levels, policies that
can increase average output might be desirable.
The only source of uncertainty in these models is monetary uncertainty.  It is straightforward to
introduce other types of uncertainty – for example, uncertainty arising from productivity shocks or
fiscal shocks.  There are three reasons why we restrict attention to monetary shocks.  First, the
consensus of the papers of this conference is that the chief reason for Mexico to consider alternative
monetary institutions is dissatisfaction with Mexico’s control of monetary policy in recent years.
Monetary shocks (perhaps arising from the banking sector) seem more significant than real
productivity or spending shocks.  Second, a major aim of this paper is to demonstrate how difficult it is
to arrive at definitive conclusions about monetary policy in the absence of good emprical evidence on
how goods prices are set and how agents can insure against foreign exchange rate changes.  That point
comes through even in models with only monetary shocks.  Third, algebraically the model is
complicated enough with only monetary shocks.  Other shocks would make things worse.
Households
Households in Mexico are assumed to maximize expected utility over an infinite horizon.  They
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C is a consumption index that is a geometric average of home and foreign consumption,  M C and  U C .
M C receives a weight of n.  There are n identical individuals in Mexico,  1 0 < < n , and  n - 1  identical
individuals in the U.S., so the weight goods produced in each country receive in the utility function is
equal to the populations proportions.  In turn,  M C and  U C  are indexes over continuums of goods
produced in Mexico and the U.S., respectively.  (Consumption of the good produced, for example, by
firm i in Mexico is  ) (i CM .)  There is a constant elasticity of substitution between goods produced
within a country, l , which is greater than 1.  Note that following Corsetti and Pesenti’s (1997)
innovation to the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) framework, this utility function does not impose that the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced within a country is the same as consumers’ elasticity
of substitution for goods produced in different countries.  (See the Appendix for further discussion of
the utility function of consumption.)
L is the labor supply of the representative home agent.  U.S. households have preferences
similar to Mexicans’.  They have identical preferences over Mexican and American-produced goods.
Labor enters the utility function linearly, but of course Americans get disutility from their own labor.
We impose a cash-in-advance constraint on consumers in both countries.  P is the exact price
index for Mexican consumption, so PC  equals total nominal spending in Mexico.  Mexicans need
peso balances to buy all goods, so we impose:
t t t C P M = ,19
where M  are nominal peso balances.  There is an analogous constraint for U.S. households, who must
hold U.S. dollars.
We consider two extreme models of the menu of assets available to households.  In the first,
agents can neither borrow nor lend.  The budget constraint for the typical Mexican is:
t t t t t t t t T M L W M C P + + + = + -1 p .
Agents are endowed with equal ownership in each of their own country’s firms.   t p  is the
representative agent’s share of profits from Mexican firms.   t T  are monetary transfers from the
government.   t W  is the wage rate.
In the second model, we assume there is a complete set of nominal state-contingent bonds
available to all households in both countries.  That is, there is an asset traded for each state of the
world, but payoffs are settled in nominal terms.  Agents must then use money payoffs to buy goods at
the nominal prices that are set for them.  See Devereux and Engel (1998) for details of this set-up.
Firms
Firms produce output using labor.  The production function for a typical Mexican firm is given
by:
t t L Y = .20
The objective of the Mexican firms is to set prices to maximize the expected utility of the firm
owners.  Mexican firms are owned by Mexican residents.  Firms must set prices for period t before any
information on the stochastic variables – Mexican and American money supply and cost shocks – is
known.  No state-contingent pricing is allowed.  As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) show, this problem
can be expressed as maximizing the expected discounted value of profits using the consumption
discount factor.
We consider the following models for pricing:
1)   Producer-currency pricing (PCP).  Under this model, the Mexican firm sets prices in peso terms
for sale to both Mexican and American consumers, and American firms set prices in dollars for sale to
both sets of consumers.  Of course, the price that Americans actually pay for Mexican goods is a dollar
price, and that price varies instantaneously with changes in the nominal exchange rate.  Likewise, the
peso price that Mexicans pay for American goods varies with the exchange rate.
While, in principal, the Mexican firm could set a different peso price for sale to Mexicans and
Americans, given the assumption of identical preferences it is clear it will choose the same ex ante
price. Given the stationarity of the model, firm i in Mexico chooses  ) (i PMt  to maximize:
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In this expression,  ) ( ) ( i nC i X Mt Mt ”  represents total sales of the Mexican good to Mexicans, and
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
* * i C n i X Mt Mt - ”  are total sales of the Mexican good to Americans.  American firms face an
analogous problem.  The optimal pricing rules are derived in the Appendix.21
2)   Local-currency pricing (LCP).  In this model, the Mexican firm chooses a peso price for
Mexican consumers and a dollar price for American consumers, ex ante.  The prices are set one period
in advance and do not change when the exchange rate changes.  Likewise, American firms set a dollar
price for American consumers and a peso price for Mexicans.
  Firm i in Mexico chooses  ) (i PMt  (the price Mexicans pay for Mexican goods) and  ) (
* i PMt  (the
dollar price that Americans pay for Mexican goods) to maximize:
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In this expression,  t S  is the peso/dollar exchange rate.
3) Mixed pricing.  In this model, it is assumed that Mexican producers set a dollar price for U.S.
consumers and a peso price for Mexican consumers, but U.S. producers set all prices in dollars.  So,
Mexican firms are LCP pricers, but U.S. firms are PCP pricers.
While the empirical evidence of section 1 indicates the law of one price does not hold for all
goods, the data is not nearly refined enough to distinguish between pricing assumption (2) and (3).
The mixed pricing assumption might be plausible given the commonly-held observation that
depreciation of the peso helps Mexican producers relative to U.S. producers.  Under the mixed pricing
model, the price Mexicans pay for Mexican-produced goods is unaffected by exchange-rate changes
but the peso price of U.S. goods increases when the peso depreciates.22
Equilibrium Relationships
Under the assumption of no capital mobility (with no initial debts), trade must be balanced each
period.  Americans spend a fraction n of their total spending on Mexican goods.  So, the typical
American spends 
* *C nP  dollars on Mexican goods.  (Starred (*) variables represent U.S. quantities.)
The peso value of those revenues is 
* *C nSP .  (The exchange rate, S, is expressed as pesos per dollar.)
Since there are  n - 1  Americans, the total peso value of exports to America from Mexico is
* * ) 1 ( C nSP n - .  Similarly, a typical Mexican spends  PC n) 1 ( -  on American imports, so the total peso
value of imports is  nPC n) 1 ( - .  Balanced trade, then, requires:
* *
t t t t t C P S C P =
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Note that this expression is identical to the assumption of trade balance in the special case of
logarithmic utility of consumption ( 1 = r ).  However, while there is no consensus on a plausible value
for the degree of relative risk aversion, almost all empirical studies (whether based on measures of risk
aversion or intertemporal substitution) find  1 > r .  We shall assume that is the case.
Another case in which these two equilibrium conditions are identical is when purchasing power
parity (
*
t t t P S P = ) holds.  As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) note, when purchasing power parity holds,
and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is unity (as it is in this model), terms23
of trade changes effectively end up acting as an insurance device.  There will be complete risk sharing,
so that 
*
t t C C = , even if no assets are traded.
The logic follows that of Cole and Obstfeld (1991).  Suppose there is a positive shock to the
domestic money supply that lead it to increase by 1 percent.  If there were no change in the exchange
rate, spending by home residents would increase 1 percent (from the cash-in-advance constraint, noting
that P is constant if the exchange rate does not change.)  But the trade balance relationship shows that
an increase in domestic consumption requires a depreciation of the domestic currency (holding P and
* P  constant.)  The depreciation of the home currency raises the price of foreign goods for home
residents and lowers the price of home goods for foreign residents.  The 1 percent increase in the
money supply implies that the home price of foreign goods rises 1 percent.  So the price increase
contributes to a  n - 1  percent decline in domestic consumption.  Combining the direct and indirect
effects, domestic consumption ultimately rises only  n n = - - ) 1 ( 1  percent.  Foreigners find the price of
home goods drop 1 percent, so their spending rises n percent.  Thus, exchange-rate changes lead to
fully insured consumption across countries.
Only in our PCP model of pricing does the law of one price apply to all goods, so it is the only
model in which purchasing power parity holds.  When there is local-currency pricing, changes in the
exchange rate do not change the prices that households pay for goods.  So, exchange rates do not play
an insurance role.
Equilibrium in the market for Mexican goods requires supply equals demand:
* ) 1 ( Mt Mt t C n nC L - + = .
In the U.S. an analogous condition obtains.24
Government
In each country, increases in money supply are transferred directly to residents. So, in Mexico,
t t t T M M + = -1 .
A similar condition holds for the U.S.
We will assume that monetary policy in the U.S. is determined independently of any





t t t v m m = - - .
Lower case letters represent the natural log of upper-case letter.  (E.g.,  ) ln( t t M m = .)
In Mexico, monetary policy under floating rates is independent of U.S. policy:
  t t t v m m = - -1 .
The i.i.d. shock,  t v , represents shocks to the money supply coming from disturbances, for
example, in the banking system that the central bank cannot control.
4  The presence of this type of
shock is critical to the evaluation of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes.  Mexico can eliminate
the effects of these shocks on the local money supply by rigidly fixing the exchange rate relative to the
dollar.  To keep the exchange rate fixed, the money supply in Mexico must mimic the U.S. money
supply.  So, by targeting the exchange rate, Mexico has an automatic mechanism to offset the effects of
t v  shocks on the money supply.
                                               
4   We assume both Mexican and U.S. monetary shocks are normally distributed.25
3. Fixed or Floating Exchange Rates?
With the exchange rate fixed at one, producers are essentially setting prices in the same
currency for Americans and Mexicans.  Given identical preferences, prices charged to each nation will
be the same.  That is,  ) ( ) (
* i P i P Mt Mt = , and  ) ( ) (
* i P i P Ut Ut = .  If the law of one price holds for all goods,
with identical preferences, purchasing power parity holds:  
*
t t P P = .  With purchasing power parity,
the trade-balance condition reduces to:
*
t t C C = .
Idiosyncratic risk is completely eliminated with fixed exchange rates because there are no
longer any idiosyncratic shocks to money supplies.  So one advantage of fixed exchange rates is the
elimination of idiosyncratic risk.
We saw in the previous section that there was complete risk sharing in the PCP model of
pricing (in which purchasing power parity holds), whether or not insurance markets exist.  We can
conclude that under that pricing scheme, the existence of capital markets does not matter for the fixed
versus floating exchange rates question.  Indeed, in the PCP case, the model is identical under no asset
trade and complete insurance markets.
Actually, the fixed versus floating rate question is also not influenced by the completeness of
markets in the case of complete local-currency pricing (LCP).  Since prices of all goods are
predetermined for consumers in each country, the price indexes do not change when there are
monetary shocks.  For example,  t P  is predetermined at time t.  But, then from the cash-in-advance26
constraint, shocks to  t C  are completely determined by shocks to the home money supply,  t M .  That
relationship is true independent of any assumptions made about what assets can be traded.  It does not
matter if there is no asset trade, or the complete set of nominal contingent claims.  The variance of
consumption is simply equal to the variance of the money supply.  (Note that because leisure enters
utility linearly, households are only risk averse with respect to consumption.)
Why does the absence of asset trade not have any effect on the risk from consumption?  The
answer is that the complete set of nominal contingent claims in this case provides no consumption
insurance.  Because we have assumed that all contracts must be written in nominal terms, the
contingent claims do not explicitly provide for real insurance.  The optimal contract implies that the
marginal value of a peso is the same for Mexicans and Americans in all states of nature.  But that
provides no consumption insurance in this model.  Suppose the Mexican peso money supply increases
in some state.  Then, the peso depreciates relative to the dollar.  This means, given the fixity of
nominal prices, that goods are cheaper in Mexico than in the U.S.  Hence, the optimal contract will call
for Mexicans to have higher consumption in that state (until the marginal value of a peso is equalized.)
Mexican consumption rises when the Mexican money supply does.  Under our assumptions, it rises
one-for-one, and there is no consumption insurance.
So, in the two extreme models of goods pricing – PCP and LCP – the completeness of financial
markets has no bearing on the fixed versus floating decision.  That is because under PCP there
effectively is complete risk sharing whether or not assets are traded, while under LCP there is no risk
sharing whether or not assets are traded.  Of course, these extreme results arise in part because of our
assumptions on preferences, but this is an excellent illustration of the interaction between the
assumptions on completeness of financial markets and goods pricing.
In the model of mixed pricing (U.S. producers set prices in dollars, Mexican producers set
prices in pesos for Mexican residents and dollars for U.S. residents), part of the appeal of fixed27
exchange rates is the elimination of idiosyncratic risk.  That effect is different under no asset trade than
when there are complete nominal contingent bonds.  Of course, fixed exchange rates do not eliminate
all risk.  There is still risk in the system from shocks to the U.S. money supply.  Moreover, welfare
maximization is not equivalent to risk minimization.  As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Devereux
and Engel (1998) discuss, the properties of the stochastic processes that determine monetary policy can
influence expected levels of consumption and leisure, as well as their variances.  (We assume shocks to
the log of the money supply are normally distributed, so the first two moments describe the entire
distribution.)  The Appendix derives the conditions under which floating or fixed rates provide the
highest welfare for Mexico.
Under mixed pricing, floating rates are preferred to fixed exchange rates if there is no
international trade in assets when:
) 1 )( 1 (


























Under both cases, floating rates are more likely to be best when home money shocks have a small
variance.  Of course, by this standard, Mexico is not a strong candidate for floating rates.  Under
complete nominal contingent bond markets, Mexico should opt for fixed exchange rates as long as the
U.S. monetary variance is lower than the Mexican.28
But, when there is no asset trade, the condition is subtler.  If Mexico were very large (so n
approaches unity) compared to the U.S., the condition (3.1) approaches the same condition as (3.2).
But, in fact, Mexico is relatively small.  As n goes to zero, condition (3.2) implies that floating rates in










The surprising thing here is that the more risk averse agents are, the more likely they are to prefer
floating exchange rates.  This may seem puzzling because fixed exchange rates eliminate idiosyncratic
risk, and would therefore seem to be more desirable for more risk averse agents.
The answer to this puzzle comes from noting that for given variances of Mexican and U.S.
money supplies, floating exchange rates tend to reduce aggregate risk (while leading to some
idiosyncratic risk.)  To understand this, note that the log of the Mexican price index can be written as:
) ~ )( 1 ( ut t mt t p s n np p + - + = . (3.3)
In this notation, (in logs) the aggregate price index,  t p , is a weighted average of the price of Mexican
goods,  mt p , and American goods,  ut t p s ~ + .  The price of American goods is set in dollars at  ut p ~ , and
varies with the exchange rate,  t s .  Since  mt p  and  ut p ~  are preset, the conditional variance of the
Mexican price level is equal to 
2 ) 1 ( n -  times the variance of the exchange rate.  But, given that
nominal spending in each of Mexico and the U.S. is equal to the money supply in each country (from29
the cash-in-advance constraint), the trade balance condition implies that the exchange rate is simply
equal to the relative money supplies.  In log terms:
*
t t t m m s - = . (3.4)
The cash-in-advance constraint along with equations (3.3) and (3.4) gives us:
ut mt t t t p n np m n nm c ~ ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* - - - - + = . (3.5)
It follows that under floating rates, when  t m  and 
*
t m  are uncorrelated:
2 2 2 2
1 * ) 1 ( ) ( v v t t n n c Var s s - + = - . (3.6)
Under fixed exchange rates,
2
1 * ) ( v t t c Var s = - . (3.7)
Since the “weights” in expression (3.6) sum to less than one, Mexican monetary variance could
be larger than American monetary variance under floating rates, but the variance of consumption could
still be lower than under fixed exchange rates.  As n declines, Mexican monetary variance can be quite
large, and still floating rates deliver a smaller consumption variance.  Indeed, comparing equations













So, even though there is idiosyncratic risk under floating rates and none under fixed exchange rates,
the total risk facing Mexicans may be smaller under floating rates – even if the variance of Mexican
money supply shocks is quite large compared to that of U.S. money supply shocks.
This helps explain the finding that floating rates become more likely to be preferred to fixed
exchange rates the greater the degree of risk-aversion.  Intuitively, under floating exchange rates the
real money supply is less volatile than the nominal money supply if there  is any pass-through of the
exchange rate to prices.  An increase in M results in a depreciation of the domestic currency.  If that
pushes up the price of imported goods, P rises as well, so  P M /  is more stable than M.
Note that it is not simply the variance of consumption that matters for the choice of exchange-
rate regime.  Equation (3.1) gives the condition under which floating exchange rates are welfare-
maximizing under no capital mobility, while equation (3.8) is the condition for consumption-variance
minimization.  As we noted, monetary policy can influence the expected levels of consumption and
leisure.  The two conditions can lead to widely different implications.  Indeed, equation (3.1) is always
a more stringent condition than equation (3.8).  Taking into account the effects on expected levels of
consumption and leisure, the case for fixed exchange rates is always stronger than if we just consider
the variance of consumption.
The relevance of this point is that if our approach to analyzing welfare were to linearize the
model around the steady state, as is commonly done in “calibrated” equilibrium macroeconomic
models, the welfare criterion would only take into account the variance of consumption in this model.
The expected levels of consumption and leisure are affected by short-run effects of monetary variance31
on price levels that would be ignored under the linearization approach.  Since the criterion for choosing
fixed or floating rates in this model can be widely different if one takes into account the full welfare-
maximizing expression versus the minimum-variance condition, one must be wary in general of the
conclusions from the calibrated linearized models.
Table 1 presents the conditions under which floating exchange rates are preferred to fixed
exchange rates in each of our models, under each assumption about completeness of asset markets.  As
we have noted, under PCP and LCP, the criteria do not depend on what assets are traded.  We note that
equation (3.1) is the welfare criterion under PCP, while equation (3.2) is the criterion under LCP.
Table 1 also presents the conditions under which floating rates are preferred if we mistakenly
only paid attention to the minimum-consumption-variance measure.  It is interesting to note that
whenever there is any pass-through of exchange rates to prices (in the mixed pricing model or the LCP
model), the welfare condition for choosing floating exchange rates is more stringent than the
minimum-consumption-variance condition.  The implication is that fixed exchange rates reduce the
monopoly distortion in prices (as discussed in Devereux and Engel (1998)) and therefore increase
expected levels of consumption.  Taking into account the effects on levels, the case for fixed exchange
rates is stronger.
4.  Conclusions
 The empirical evidence presented in section 1 is suggestive but far from definitive.  The
indication from this preliminary look at the data is that deviations from the law of one price for
consumer goods in Mexico is large, and that there may be some local-currency pricing.  The
responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rates is not complete, but more work is required to
understand the nature of the price-adjustment process in Mexico.32
The model section underscores the importance of this empirical work.  The stabilizing
properties of exchange-rate regimes, and the effects of exchange-rate regime on the efficiency level of
the economy, are dependent on the nature of price setting.  Furthermore, the type of price-setting
behavior interacts with the completeness of financial markets.  We have seen that if the law of one
price holds for all goods, then there is complete consumption insurance even in the absence of any
asset trade.  In absolute contrast, if there is complete local-currency pricing, there is no consumption
insurance even if there is a complete set of nominal contingent bonds traded.
The models considered here are, in many ways, very simple and too crude to “calibrate” and
come up with a precise measure of the gains from fixing the exchange rate, for example.  The models
can only make suggestions about some of the things that policy-makers should consider in choosing an
exchange rate regime.  This paper emphasizes the role of price setting and capital mobility.  There are
other factors that surely are important as well.
So, what are the intuitive lessons from the models of this paper?
1) Of course, permanently fixed exchange rates are more likely to be desirable for a country if it
has little control otherwise of its own monetary conditions.
2) The degree of capital mobility may or may not matter for the choice of exchange-rate regime,
depending on how goods prices are set.  While fixing the exchange rate may reduce or eliminate
idiosyncratic risk among countries, the overall risk for the country fixing its exchange rate may not be
affected or may be increased.
3) There is an automatic stabilizing property to flexible exchange rates even when the only shocks
are monetary shocks, if there is any exchange-rate pass-through.
4) The choice of exchange-rate regime could affect the degree of monopolistic inefficiency in the
economy.33
Not all of these conclusions, of course, are new.  The first point is a standard in the exchange-
rate literature, and the third point is implicit in some of the papers produced in the 1980s.  (However,
all of this literature presumes complete pass-through of exchange rates to consumer prices.) The
second and the fourth points are new insights that arise from the new open-economy macroeconomics.
Further research is needed to assess their importance.
The empirical evidence for Mexico suggests that the model of mixed pricing and imperfect
insurance may be the most useful in assessing the benefits of permanently fixing exchange rates to the
U.S. dollar (perhaps through dollarization.)  Mexican monetary policy has been less stable that U.S.
monetary policy, so it would seem that adopting U.S. monetary policy would automatically make
consumption more stable.  But this paper raises some doubt on that issue.  Floating rates have an
automatic stabilizing property that reduce the volatility of monetary shocks when there is a high degree
of pass through of exchange rates to import prices.  Unfortunately, our empirical analysis is not refined
enough to determine how large is the pass-through of exchange rates to final goods prices in Mexico.
The less pass-through there is to final goods prices, the stronger the case for a more fixed exchange
rate.34
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Criteria for Floating versus Fixed Exchange Rates
Welfare Consumption Variance
Mixed pricing, trade balance
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Local-currency, complete 1 1
Producer-currency pricing
) 1 )( 1 (
















 is less than the entry in
each cell.  “Mixed pricing” refers to the case in which U.S. producers set all prices in dollars, and
Mexican producers set prices for Mexican households in pesos and for U.S households in dollars.
“Local-currency” refers to the case in which all prices are set in the households’ currency.  “Producer-
currency pricing” refers to the case in which all prices are set in the producers’ currency.  “Trade
balance” refers to the assumption of no asset trade, so trade is always balanced.  “Complete” refers to
the assumption of a complete set of state-contingent bonds.  Note that under producer-currency pricing
the criteria are the same under trade balance and complete bonds.  “Welfare” refers to using expected
utility as the criteria for choosing between floating and fixed exchange rates.  “Consumption variance”
refers to using minimum consumption variance as the criterion for choosing the exchange-rate system1
Figure 1
Variance Decomposition of Mexican-U.S. Real Exchange Rate Changes 




































































































































































Correlation of Nominal Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate 
and Relative Traded Goods Prices 
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The price index, P, used to deflate nominal balances is the exact price index associated with the
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There are three sets of pricing assumptions: mixed, PCP and LCP.  For each of these, we can
derive expressions for the prices of goods from the optimization problem of firms.  It is then useful to
simplify the expressions using either the trade balance condition (with no trade in assets) or the risk-
sharing condition (with complete nominal claims.)
Mt P  is the peso price paid by Mexicans for Mexican-produced goods.  
*
Mt P  is the dollar price
paid by Americans for Mexican-produced goods.  Ut P  is the dollar price paid by Americans for
American-produced goods. 
*
Ut P  is the peso price paid by Mexicans for American-produced goods.3
1.  Mixed
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Imposing the appropriate equilibrium condition, and using condition (A.2), the equations for
prices reduce to:
Trade Balance Complete Markets
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Imposing the appropriate equilibrium condition, and using condition (A.2), the equations for
prices reduce to:
Trade Balance Complete Markets
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Imposing the appropriate equilibrium condition, and using condition (A.2), the equations for
prices reduce to (recognizing that trade balance and complete markets are equivalent):
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so, we get






















































































The left-hand side of this equation is equal to 
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We have used the fact that 
2 2
* * m c s s =  because U.S. prices are preset.  In the notation used here,  * mm s
is the covariance between domestic and foreign money shocks.  From equation (3.5) in the text:
* * ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 2
mm m m c n n n n s s s s - + - + = (A.5)8
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Under fixed exchange rates,  * *
2 2
mm m m s s s = = .  Under floating rates  0 * = mm s .  The welfare
criteria from Table 1 can then be derived from the above expression.
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This implies






































































































































































From the Mexican and U.S. cash-in-advance constraint, and the risk sharing condition (noting that
prices for U.S. households are preset, and that the peso price of Mexican-produced goods for Mexican
households is preset):
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Substituting in, we get
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In this model, we derive
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Again using the fact that under fixed exchange rates,  * *
2 2
mm m m s s s = = , and under floating rates
0 * = mm s , the welfare criteria from Table 1 can then be derived from the above expressions.
3.  PTM, Trade Balance
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Here we have used the fact that in this model 
2 2
m c s s =  and 
2 2
* * m c s s = .  Solving these we get
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We can arrive at the welfare criteria for fixed versus floating (reported in Table 1) just as in the
previous cases.  In particular, we find simply that floating rates are preferred to fixed rates when
2 2
* m m s s < .


























































































































where we have used the fact that in this model 
2 2
m c s s =  and 
2 2
* * m c s s = .  Since in this model
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We arrive at the results in Table 1 as in the previous sections.
5. PCP






































































































Since in this model 
* / t t t M M S =  and 
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Plugging in, we get
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Using the expressions above, we arrive at the welfare criteria presented in Table 1.